Add enterprise authorization to OpenAI Sandbox Agents
OpenAI provides the agent harness and workspace. PaloNexus provides enterprise authority and downstream access.
OpenAI’s sandbox support gives an agent an isolated Unix-like workspace, and its architecture deliberately separates the trusted agent harness (model calls, tools, handoffs, approvals, tracing, run state) from the sandbox compute plane (filesystem and command execution) — noting that authentication, audit, billing, and human review belong in trusted infrastructure outside the sandbox. The intended PaloNexus integration slots into exactly that seam: PaloNexus would be the trusted authority service the harness consults before an agent touches an enterprise system, with downstream secrets kept outside the sandbox entirely.
Intended integration
Section titled “Intended integration”In the designed flow, OpenAI Agents SDK hooks or tools would call PaloNexus before sensitive operations:
- The agent, running in OpenAI’s harness with its sandbox workspace, would reach a protected enterprise action (deploy, restart, query, payment).
- A harness hook would present the agent’s identity, the on-behalf-of human, and the task
to PaloNexus
/authz— deny-by-default, the same decision contract the shipped SDK adapters use today. - PaloNexus would resolve the agent’s accountable owner and active delegation, and verify that any approver is actually entitled to approve this action on this resource — not just that an approval occurred.
- On allow, PaloNexus would perform the call through a governed tool or issue a short-lived, audience-bound credential to the trusted harness side — the sandbox never receives a durable secret.
- Every decision would land on the authority trail, linking the OpenAI run to the human, delegation, policy, and resource behind it.
What PaloNexus would and would not do
Section titled “What PaloNexus would and would not do”PaloNexus would not duplicate what OpenAI’s platform already owns: sandbox manifests, snapshot handling, filesystem semantics, session restoration, or command execution. The harness’s own approvals remain useful as orchestration; PaloNexus would add what they are not designed to establish:
- Accountable identity — every agent bound to an active human owner and sponsor.
- Organization-derived authority — permissions traced from the workforce directory, roles, and resource ownership, not application config.
- Approval entitlement checking — verifying the approver has authority over the affected resource, may delegate it, and is still active in that role.
- Token exchange — short-lived, audience- and task-bound runtime credentials instead of standing API keys.
- Revocation — access cut when the task closes, the delegation is revoked, or the owner leaves — independent of the run’s state.
- Cross-system audit lineage — one authority trail spanning every system the agent touched, not per-run tracing alone.
What is available today
Section titled “What is available today”For builds on LangChain, LangGraph, or Deep Agents, the same pattern is shipped now as SDK adapters — see Keep secrets outside Deep Agents sandboxes. Framework-agnostic network-layer enforcement for agents deployed on Kubernetes is also shipped — see Credential-safe action enforcement.
- Integrations overview — every ecosystem with honest status.
- What PaloNexus is not — including “not an agent framework” and “not a sandbox provider.”